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Conglomerate Merger: A New
Source of Antitrust Tensions
Arthur D. Austin
I. INTRODUCTION
ONTROVERSY OVER THE ROLE of antitrust law in guid-
ing and protecting the economy, sharp divergence of opinion
as to the quality of its connection to competition, and expressions of
doubt over its capacity to effectively respond to the accelerating
claims of business technology
have been part of the Amen-
THE AUTHOR: ARTHUR D. AUSTIN can scene since the Sherman
(B.S., University of Virginia; J.D., Tu- Antitrust Acte was enacted in
lane University) is an Associate Profes-
sor of Law at Case Western Reserve 1890. The pyrotechnics of
University and is admitted to the Vir- public dialogue encompass a
ginia and Federal Bars. His teaching
specialties are Antitrust and Contracts. wide range of views, including
such recent examples as Gal-
braith's conclusion that the fait
accompli of concentration makes antitrust outmoded, perhaps harm-
ful, and at best a charade,' the Bork and Bowman thesis' (disputed
by Professors Blake and Jones) 4 that the Sherman5 and Clayton
Acts8 have recently been enforced in a way that distorts competi-
tion, and finally, the widespread view that the judiciary relies far
too much on a priori economic theories. 7
Conglomeration is the latest entrant into the arena of debate.
It appeared with so much vigor and with such a perplexing array of
problems that it now completely overshadows all other topics of
antitrust concern. Although it is still too early to ascertain the full
import of the changes in the industrial fabric that this phenomenon
will evoke, there has been a fruition of experience to the point that
115 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
2 J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDusTnuAL STATE (1967). For a brief rebuttal, see
Turner, The Merits of Antimerger Policy: A Reply to Professor Galbraith, 19 CASE
W. RES. L REv. 201 (1968).
3Bork & Bowman, The Crisis In Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965).
4 Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1965).
515 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
C Clayton Act, ch. 25, § 7, 38 Star. 631 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
7 Austin, A Priori Mechanical Jurisprudence in Antitrust, 53 IANN. L. REV.
739 (1969).
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some significant alterations in antitrust jurisprudence can be antici-
pated on a level of discernment which permits projective discussion.
The vigorous stresses produced by conglomeration point to one or a
combination of the following effects: First, an absence of prece-
dential guidelines, magnified by the thrust of some pressures to be
described below, make it likely that the judiciary will embrace a
prismatic set of proscriptive standards derived from particularized
socio-economic value judgments on the appropriateness of conglom-
eration. This would represent a clear departure from the traditional
focus on ascertaining whether competition has been lessened in
specific markets. Second, the executive branch will gain a degree
of leverage over the decision making processes of the nation's in-
dustrial complex to a degree heretofore unknown. Finally, there is
the possibility that legislation will be enacted which would consti-
tute a significant expansion of government regulation of business.
II. THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER:
WHAT DOES IT DO TO COMPETITION?
The recent activities of the Justice Department cloak the issue of
the applicability and the appropriateness of antitrust proscription
of conglomeration with immediate priority.' Economists and anti-
trusters acknowledge that the peculiar relational consequences of
the conglomerate merger raise difficult questions in the area of
competitive effects. Since by definition the merging companies do
not directly compete with each other nor stand in a buyer-seller re-
8 Courts and most commentators mechanically assume that Congress intended that
the Celler-Kefauver amendments of 1950, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1964), embrace con-
glomerates. There is legislative dialogue supporting this view. Blair, The Conglomer-
ate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672, 673 (1958). Dissenters, how-
ever, argue that conglomerate mergers are without the coverage of the amendments
because such mergers do not produce the effects envisioned by the congressional com-
petitive effects standard of proscription. Professor Blair notes another dissenting
view: "Congress did not really understand the nature of 'true' conglomerate mergers
and therefore did not intend to reach them." Id. at 674. Professor Narver supports
the conclusions that legislative concern with conglomerates - much less the conse-
quences of conglomeration - was light and that Congress lacked a sufficiently precise
definition of conglomeration to enable more penetrating formulation of policy. J.
NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION 33-59 (1968).
Narver observes:
Unfortunately, the legislators seemed content to keep their analysis of impli-
cations at the socio-political level, a level to which the wording of the
amended Act does not explicitly relate. As we have seen, even the FTC, the
most actively interested agency, failed to undertake a study of the compo-
nents and consequences of conglomerate mergers. Id. at 59.
It is interesting to note that until the 1930's courts assumed that diversification was
beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. Hale, Diversification: Impact of Monopoly
Policy Upon Multi-Product Firms, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 320, 324-27 (1950).
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lationship,9 many observers feel that traditional indicators shed
little light on the crucial issue of market effects.10  Professor
Turner frames the problem:
The rules developed for determining the validity of horizontal and
vertical mergers dearly will not do for conglomerate acquisition
generally. In the familiar types of horizontal and vertical merger
cases, the Supreme Court has come to place important... weight
9 E. SINGER, ANTiTRUST EcoNoMIcs: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND EcoNoMIc
MODELS 259 (1968).
Most observers define conglomeration in residual terms, ie., all mergers not falling
within the horizontal or vertical categories are conglomerate. However, agreement on
subclassifications varies. Professor Turner distinguishes "pure" conglomerates - no
discernible economic relationship between acquiring and acquired firms - from
"mixed" conglomerates. He divides the latter classification into: (1) Market extension
mergers - both firms produce the same product but sell it in different geographic
markets; (2) product extension mergers - the firms produce different products but
they can be produced through the same facilities, or they can be sold through the same
distribution channels, or the products can be absorbed into a unified research and de-
velopment program. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (1965). Davidow's view of the product extension mer-
ger is broader. He concludes that the "term covers any consolidation of the two firms
whose products are so related that they may be distributed, advertised, or sold in the
same manner, through the same outlets, or to the same customers." Davidow, Con-
glomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act,
68 CoLuM. L REv. 1231, 1232 (1968). Narver continues the definitional expansion.
After placing conglomeration in the usual residual context, he observes that the con-
glomeration "spectrum is exclusively a matter of the degree of technological and re-
source 'fit' between the merging firms." J. NARVER, supra note 8, at 4. Finally, on
occasion the terms "diversification" and "multiproduct firm" have been employed to
cover the end result of a conglomerate merger. See Hale, supra note 8. Even when
conglomeration is viewed in this context, substantial differences exist. Many feel that
a diversified firm is not necessarily a conglomerate. According to Fortune magazine,
before a company can be classified as conglomerate it must engage in at least eight
different business categories. Hruska, Bigness and Diversification: The Conglomerate,
38 ANimRusT L.J. 192, 193 (1969). Forbes magazine resolves the problem by break-
ing down a broad "multicompany" classification into three subcategories. "Multi-in-
dustry" firms are those that have diversified internally over a long period of time.
"Agglomerates" are financially oriented firms operating as holding companies. "Con-
glomerate" firms are widely diversified and are subject to fairly rigid centralized manage-
ment control. FORBES, Jan. 1, 1970, at 96.
The lack of precision in defining the conglomerate merger and in analyzing its ef-
fects undoubtedly accounted for Congress' including all forms of mergers under a
single standard. See note 8 supra.
I0 That is, conglomerate mergers do not create the type of effects that are relevant
to, or measurable by, the antitrust notion of adverse competitive effects. Narver says:
"All in all, then, the fundamental conclusion of this analysis is that conglomerate
mergers are not inherently procompetitive or anticompetitive." J. NARvER, supra
note 8, at 137. See Davidow, supra note 9, at 1238; Reilly, The Conglomerate Merger:
A Need for Clarity, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 290, 291 (1968); Rill, Conglomerate Mergers:
The Problem of "Superconcentration," 14 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 1028, 1053 (1967);
Turner, supra note 9, at 1315-16.
Another view is that conglomerate mergers should be presumptively legal. Day,
Conglomerate Mergers and The Curse of Bigness, 42 N.C.L. REV. 511, 557 (1964).
At least one Supreme Court Justice has expressed doubts as to whether Clayton 7
covers conglomerate mergers. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 587
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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on the share of the relevant markets controlled by the acquiring
and acquired companies. . . . But whatever significance can be
attached to market shares in these cases, quite clearly the signifi-
cance becomes less when we deal with conglomerate mergers, and
indeed may completely vanish."
This is not to imply a total absence of judgmental reference
points. There is broad agreement that conglomeration raises at
least five possible consequences which might be translated into anti-
competitive effects: (1) Reciprocal trading and tying arrangements,
thought to be the natural concomitant of multiproduct production
and distribution; (2) the conglomerator, in the process of acquisi-
tion, erases its influences as a potential competitor; (3) diversifi-
cation which makes it possible to subsidize a given product or firm;
(4) if the acquiring firm is large, the erection of barriers to entry;
and (5) "conglomerate power" - a descriptive term for the advan-
tages gained over rivals by virtue of diversification even though
the firm does not exert monopolistic power, or anything similar, in
any given market.' 2
With varying degrees of intensity the validity and utility of each
of these points has been questioned. Professor Stigler skeptically
remarks on conglomerate power: "I must confess that the exact
mechanics by which the total power possessed by the firm gets to
be larger than the sum of the parts (in individual markets) escapes
me .... ." As to subsidization, one commentator noted that this
"danger seems to have been more apparent than real, for since 1950
only one Section 7 case has arguably involved the kind of subsidized
price-cutting envisioned by the Commission's 1947 report.' '1 4  Doubts
exist as to whether reciprocity,'" tying arrangements, 6 and subsidiza-
"lTurner, supra note 9, at 1315-16.
12 It is also argued that an increased number of diversified firms would engender
a "quiet life" economy. "Like national states, the great conglomerates may come to
have recognized spheres of influence and may hesitate to fight local wars vigorously
because the prospect of local gain are [sic] not worth the risk of general warfare."
Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monop-
oly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45 (1964-65).
13 Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176, 184
(1955).
14 Davidow, supra note 9, at 1255. Turner says: "To sum up, predatory pricing
seems so improbable a consequence of conglomerate acquisitions that it deserves little
weight in formulating antimerger rules based on prospective effects." Turner, supra
note 9, at 1346. See P. AREEDA, ANTnTRUST ANALYSIs 519-21 (1967); E. SINGER,
supra note 9, at 260-66.
15 It is arguable that the degree to which reciprocity is practiced has been over-
stated. Stigler says: "[R]eciprocity is probably much more talked about than practiced,
and is important chiefly where prices are fixed by the state or a cartel." Stigler,
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tion are peculiarly the inevitable product of conglomeration. The
mere fact that diversification results in patterns of corporate rela-
tionships making it possible to engage in certain activities implies
nothing more than the existence of the relationships. Barriers to
entry and potential competition are part of the "new antitrust"
which focuses on market environment and employs oligopoly the-
ory as a predicate for reaching conclusions as to probable adverse
competitive effects. The a priori flavor and the paucity of empiri-
cal support for this perspective is a source of concern.17 Even
when employed in analysis of horizontals, verticals, and joint ven-
tures, the concept of potential competition and the doctrine of bar-
riers to entry require a high level of appreciation for the proper mix-
ture of economic theory and law, modulated by a sense of judicial
restraint.'8  This is a burden greatly increased by conglomeration.
All of the analytical reference points briefly described above
have been embraced and utilized by the Justice Department and
the Federal Trade Commission; varied interpretations have been
etched in decisions, guidelines, and public pronouncements. Never-
theless, opinion varies from concern and dubiety to total disbelief
regarding the efficacy of these standards in proscribing conglomer-
Working Paper for the Task Force on Productivity and Competition: Reciprocity, 115
CONG. REC. 6479 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
Another argument is that reciprocity is repugnant to the "profit center" concept
upon which conglomeration is based:
Under this concept each division and subsidiary has its own separate decen-
tralized purchasing and sales department. The compensation and promotion
of the individuals who manage each profit center is determined by the per-
formance of their own profit center, not by the performance of it as a
whole.... [TMhe management of each profit center would resist reciprocal
dealing arrangements because they would only increase the volume and profits
of other profit centers .... United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 5 72,943, at 87,646-47 (D. Conn.
Oct. 21, 1969) (footnotes omitted).
16 Hale, supra note 8, at 344-48.
17 Austin, supra note 7. One economist contends that the crux of the problem is
that existing economic theory simply does not acknowledge or take into account the
conglomerate merger. He says: "The theorists have completely ignored conglomerates.
They're saying in effect that our theory doesn't explain conglomerates, so therefore
conglomerates are wrong rather than our theory. But in fact the theory is woefully in-
adequate - and not just about conglomerates." FORBES, Jan. 1, 1970, at 104.
18 Speaking of potential competition, Professor Cook says:
The courts and the Commission are now moving to find proscribed effects
in more exotic potential restraints. Thus, the existence of potential competi-
tion, which could suffice to block any merger, can produce the prohibited
effect. The test of illegality seems to have graduated from being a probable
lessening of competition to being a possible increase in concentration,
brought about by the removal of a possible competitor, who possibly might
not be replaced by others. Cook, Merger Law and Big Business: A Look
Ahead, 40 N.Y.U.L REV. 710, 713 (1965).
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ation. The Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy (Neal Report),
released on May 21, 1969, acknowledged that as to the conglomer-
ate merger "existing knowledge provides little basis for forecasting
adverse effects on competition that support application" of Clayton
7.19 The Neal Report characterized the indicators now employed
(mentioned specifically are potential competition, reciprocity, and
deep-pocket subsidization) to fill precedential gaps as unrespon-
sive to the point of encouraging speculation and conjecture on the
part of the judiciary. The Report of President Nixon's Task Force
on Productivity and Competition (Stigler Report) appeared on
June 16, 1969.20 There is a head-on clash of philosophy and con-
clusion between the Neal and Stigler Reports. Consequently, it is
noteworthy that their single point of accord touches on the inability
to formulate a rationale for contouring conglomeration into the
antitrust mold. On this point, the Stigler Report is succinct in its
skepticism: "The acquiring of an enterprise by a firm which has
interest in other related enterprises, unlike a horizontal merger, has
no direct anti-competitive effects. It leaves the competitive situa-
tion essentially unchanged. Indeed, the main complaints about the
conglomerate relate to other things."
2 1
III. A PREcis OF THE NON-ANTITRUST TENSIONS
THAT SHAPE JUDICIAL ATTITUDES ON CONGLOMERATION
The conglomerate merger is without doubt the most explosive
issue to emerge in the business world since the disdainful machina-
tions of the trust-builders sparked the nation's first antitrust crusade.
One writer recently noted: "As the 1890's were the heyday of the
trusts, so this decade is rapidly emerging as the golden age of the
19TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY, 115 CONG. REc. 5642 (daily
ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NEAL REPORT].
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is, of course, the primary statute employed in anti-
trust merger litigation. It prohibits corporate acquisitions "where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition ... may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." Clayton Act, ch. 25, § 7, 38
Star. 631 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
20 REPORT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COM-
PETITION, 115 CONG. REC. 6472 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) [hereinafter cited as
STIGLER REPORT].
21 Coase, Working Paper for the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, 115
CONG. REc. 6478-79 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) (emphasis added).
Donald Baker, Chief of the Antitrust Division Evaluation Section has written:
'These kinds of [conglomerate merger] questions really raise what are broad political
and legislative issues. They deal with the total impact on society rather than on the
particular effects in individual markets which have been the general concern of anti-
trust." Baker, How to Hook the Conglomerate, TRIAL 12, 18 (April-May 1969).
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conglomerates." 22  The pervasiveness of the conglomerate merger
movement is indisputable - FTC figures indicate that during the
period 1960-66, 71 percent of all mergers involving large manu-
facturing and mining firms were conglomerate.23  The conglomer-
ate technique has become familiar in such "noncommercial" areas
as science24 and higher education,25 and has even made an appear-
ance in the war on poverty.2 6 Media attention has been expansive,
at times pushing such permanent fixtures as war and civil rights
to the background. Tides like The Urge to Merge: The Time of
the Conglomerates7 and The Conglomerates' War to Reshape In-
dustry28 are representative of the deluge of writings appearing in
the popular press. In general, the conglomerate has received a bad
press, so bad that in some circles it has become a term of disap-
probation," conjuring up images of sinister conduct and, thus, a
designation to take public relations measures against. One of the
largest and best known conglomerates, Textron, Inc., endeavors to
"persuade shareholders and general public alike that it is a 'multi-
industry' company quite different from more flamboyant conglom-
erates."3 0
The increasing ubiquity of the conglomerate accounts for much,
but by no means all, of its notoriety. One of the surprising elements
of this scenario is that an imposing amount of the most vehemently
critical commentary comes from the business community itself.
Much of the reason for this is that many of the conglomerate
practitioners have invaded what were thought to be invulnerable
enclaves of power. Large and financially powerful firms, relishing
the "quiet life at the top" of the hierarchy and, until recent times,
confidently secure from assault, can no longer rely on the defense
of prestige and of being "in." As one experienced observer de-
scribed the climate: "Proud old names have already been taken
over... . Foreboding, frustration, and even fear are epidemic in
22 Davidow, supra note 9, at 1232.
23ABA ANTriRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 83 n.57 (1968).
24 Lear, Will the Science Brain Bank Go Conglomerate? SATURDAY REV., July 5,
1969, at 37.
2 5 Ridgeway, Universities as Big Business, HA"'eR's, Sept. 1968, at 29.
20 N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1968, at 66, col. 1.
27 N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
28TIME, March 7, 1969, at 75.
2 9 The unfavorable connotations of the word have even been applied to the world
of crime. Time magazine recently described La Cosa Nostra as The Conglomerate of
Crime. TIME, Aug. 22, 1969, at 17.
30 Textron. Yankee-Style Conglomerate, FIN. WoRLD, July 9, 1969, at 5.
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perhaps three out of five big corporate headquarters."'" In keeping
with the times, many of the most successful conglomerators are
young and aggressive newcomers who deftly put together compli-
cated deals with an air of insouciance and who frequently turn the
establishment on its collective head with lightening-fast unorthodox
takeover tactics.32 Tender offers (whereby the acquiring firm seeks
control by addressing an irresistible offer to the target company's
shareholders) ,3 sneak, and ambush attacks are now familiar terms
used in describing the tactics of many conglomerators. Espionage is
allegedly part of the game.3 4  In distinguishing "defensive" from
"offensive" conglomerates, one commentator says of the latter:
This group has promoter-type managers, who are quietly reminis-
cent of the more colorful merger promoters of the past. They use
the promoter's lingo and have a knack for verbally dressing up
their divisions with such titles as "energy resource base," "recrea-
tion and leisure-time division," "education technology group," and
so on.
35
Many observers are worried about the possible deleterious ef-
fects on the stock market and on investors. Anticipation of take-
over prompts, so it is charged, violent upswings in stock prices
which exceed to a dangerous degree the economic value of the
shares.36  Another alleged dangerous possibility is the so-called
"chain letter" effect. Generally, the investor's evaluation of a firm's
profitability is determined by its price-earnings ratio, a term used
to describe "the amount one must currently pay for each dollar of
expected corporate earnings. 3 7  Anticipation that earnings per
share will rise generates high stock prices and, of importance to the
31 Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FoRTuNE, Feb. 1969, at 79.
32 Of the "new breed" Time says:
They have fought their way up from obscurity by innovating and taking risks
in a way that flabbergasts conventional executives. They are seldom hired
managers; most are founders and owners still in their 40's .... They are
willing to dare much to gain a larger hold on the future. TIME, March 7,
1969, at 76.
83There are two basic criticisms of the tender offer technique: (1) Offerors are
characterized as "corporate raiders who are set upon liquidating the companies over
which they seek control." Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition By Tender
Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 324 (1967). (2) The offeree frequently is not supplied
with sufficient information for making a rational decision. Id. at 326.
34 Burck, supra note 31, at 83.
35 S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS AND THE ECONOMY 195 (1968).
3 6 Jim Ling contends that by paying "substantial premiums over the market
price ... literally thousands and thousands of persons [have been given the opportunity
to] have a better economic life." Ling, An Insider Looks at Conglomerates, 57 Ky.
L.J. 382, 395 (1969).
3 7 E. DONALDSON & J. PFAHL, CORPORATE FINANCE 401 (2d ed. 1963).
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conglomerator, the higher the market value of the shares the more
he can borrow for acquisition purposes. At this point, it is obvious
that for many firms to continue conglomerating, the price-earnings
ratio must maintain a constant upward swing. One method of
improving earnings, and presumably the price-earnings ratio, is by
internal growth. Another and much faster method is to acquire
a firm whose shares are selling at a lower price-earnings ratio. The
consequence of this maneuver is a higher earnings per share than
exhibited previously - at least on paper.38  The sensitivity of the
investor to the increase in earnings per share will inevitably prompt
a jump in price-earnings ratio. It is the surmise of some that it is
this dependence on an attractive price-earnings ratio that locks the
conglomerator into the acquisition habit. More importantly, the in-
creased price-earnings ratio springs from the mere fact of acquisi-
tion and not from the substance of growth. Hence, the argument
that the investor gets fictitious value for his money, or, as one ob-
server says: "[WJhen growth is entirely generated by acquisitions,
the investor is playing a game of transfers or chain letters."39
There are additional complaints: Conglomerators use "Chinese
money"40 (securities of doubtful future value) to finance aggres-
sion; dedicated executives are milked for knowledge and then sum-
marily dismissed; "creative" accounting methods are employed to
boost stock share values;4' and doubts have been raised as to the
capacity of conglomerate management to effectively control an ex-
pansive empire. 2  This latter criticism is usually raised in connec-
38 Burck, supra note 31, at 81.
391d. See Davidow, supra note 9, at 1238.
The Stigler Report concluded that any "chain letter" possibility is an SEC problem.
STIGLER REPORT, supra note 20, at 6478.
There is not total agreement that financial trickery is involved. After examining
10 firms, one commentator said: "In general, the record suggests that the public's in-
creasingly dark suspicions about conglomerate's earnings are unwarranted." Louis,
Ten Conglomerates and How They Grew, FORTUINE, May 15, 1969, at 152.
40 
"Chinese money" most frequently used consists of debentures and stock war-
rants. ThuE, March 7, 1969, at 79.
41 For example, the "pooling of interest" technique recreates a balance sheet that
assumes an ab initio relationship between the firms. The consequence is a tax savings
to stockholders. Perhaps more significantly, acquired and acquiring firm profits
from the year of merger are pooled, often boosting earnings for that year. Finally,
"pooling" disguises an excessive payment by the acquiring company for the target
company's shares. Burck, supra note 31, at 82.
4 2 Willard F. Rockwell, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors of North Ameri-
can Rockwell Corp., one of the nation's largest multiproduct firms, expressed skepti-
cism "of a corporate mixture where you throw together under one management many
different kinds of unrelated business .... ." Mr. Rockwell added: "Just because an
executive is good at running a manufacturing concern doesn't mean he can take over
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tion with the type of conglomerate that embraces totally unrelated
businesses. Richard McLaren, Antitrust Division Chief, suggests
that conglomeration has a human resource depletion effect. He
argues:
When the headquarters of one or two large companies are removed
from the nation's smaller cities to New York or Chicago or Los
Angeles, I think we all recognize that there is a serious impact
upon the community. The loss is felt by its banks, its merchants,
its professional and service people .... The community loses some
of its best educated, most energetic and public spirited citizens.43
"Good" conglomerates acknowledge the validity of some of
these criticisms but counter that they portray only the "bad" con-
gloms - the "raiders" who are insensitive to the rules of the game.
Another rebuttal is that in any movement of consequence and value
some excesses must be tolerated. Sound financing, with share-
holder interests in mind, and rational target company selection can,
say the "goods," have a beneficial business and societal effect."'
A properly structured conglomerate makes it possible to shift
large amounts of capital to new fields of potential expansion, thus
maintaining a responsive allocation of resources, raising standards of
living, and creating new jobs. It has also been suggested that as a
result of attractive tender offers the shareholder has for the first
time an effective means of exerting influence over corporate des-
tiny, in addition to getting top dollar.45
The free-swinging "bad" congloms consider the myriad of criti-
cisms as part of a program of persecution and harassment instituted
by the entrenched and conservative elements of an out-of-touch
establishment. They feel that it is neither altruism nor concern
over possible anticompetitive market effects that inspires the bar-
rage of complaints and the pleas for government intervention; in-
the operations of a bank or an insurance company." Business Mergers - What's Right,
What's Wrong, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 19, 1969, at 71-72.
43 Address by Antitrust Division Chief Richard W. McLaren, House Ways and
Means Committee, March 12, 1969, in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 50,233, at 55,467 (1969),
Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Antitrust Subcommittee presently
engaged in a study of conglomeration, agrees with this view. Celler, Conglomerate
Merger Investigations, 38 ANTITRusT L.J. 184 (1969). This position has been criti-
cized. Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at 103; Hruska, supra
note 9, at 201.
44 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 19, 1969, at 70.
45 Burck says: "Thus the stockholder, relegated by Adolf Berle and other non-
contemporary economists to a limbo of impotent ownership, has found himself inad-
vertently practicing Stockholder Power." Burck, supra note 31, at 79-80. Of course,
since a sale is effected the shareholder exercises this power only one time. Davidow,
supra note 9, at 1281. See also Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 33.
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
stead it can be attributed solely to the vulnerability of the establish-
ment to takeover by the newcomers.46  As far as the "mavericks"
are concerned, the old guard is in many cases clinging to archaic
business values and to methods of operation out of touch with a
swiftly changing economy. They assert that business growth is
stimulated by takeovers that expose and weed out inefficient,
sluggish, and uninspired managements. Since conglomerators are
committed by instinct and necessity to innovation and growth, the
argument is that they are less likely to become part of the "accom-
modative" syndrome. For example, it has been suggested that suc-
cessful takeover of Jones & Laughlin, Inc. by Jim Ling's Ling-
Temco-Vought, Inc. would have procompetitive effects because
the price leadership of United States Steel Corp. would be disrupted
by the injection of new life into a group of tired old dancing
partners.48 Thus, so the argument goes, while conglomeration does
not alter the relative market shares of the firms, the immediate ef-
fect is the creation of "new" competition.
IV. THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF
PARTICULARiSTIC AD HOCISM: A PROJECTION
One consequence of these new tensions is to thrust the judiciary
into a vast labyrinth of value judgments. Of course, certain value
judgments are permanent fixtures on the antitrust battleground and
hence are not particularly indigenous to the conglomerate cipher.
The "generality and adaptability" of the antitrust laws delegates to
the courts a wide spectrum of responsibility to interpret." "In the
anti-trust field," Judge Wyzanski once said, "the courts have been
accorded, by common consent, an authority they have in no other
4 6 Fortune observed:
The events that triggered Washington into action are not hard to discern.
It was not the number of mergers or the concentration xatios, but rather the
threat to the established way of doing corporate business . . . . Suddenly,
what had been accepted as proper depredation and financing procedures -
not to mention a prudent price-earnings ratio - became chinks in manage-
ments armor against stockholder attacks. FORTUNE, May 1, 1969, at 44.
47 Burck, supra note 31, at 80. One economist approves of conglomerate power
because of a possible countervailing effect on government power. "The government
has such sheer power. It would be marvelous to have big companies push the govern-
ment around a bit." Clients and Conglomerates, TRIAL 9, 10 (April-May 1969).
4 8 TME, April 4, 1969, at 89.
4 9 M r. Chief Justice Hughes once wrote: "We have said that the Sherman Act, as a
charter of freedom, has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be
desirable in constitutional provisions.. . Thus in applying its broad prohibitions,
each case demands a dose scrutiny of its own facts." Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
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branch of enacted law."'50 The discretion inherent in this authority
has not been overlooked. For example, in 1927 the Supreme Court,
still clinging to an afterglow blend of social Darwinism, accepted
the presence of the industrial giant and its immense power provided
the power was not exerted in an "abusive" manner.5 By 1948,
perspectives had changed: "The mere existence of the power to
monopolize, together with the purpose or intent to do so, consti-
tute[d] an evil at which the [Sherman] Act [was] aimed."5"
Much of the reaction against the localization of brute corporate size
in a given market arose as a result of the view that the imposition
of antitrust strictures might on occasion embrace social objectives.
Judge Learned Hand made the best known statement of antitrust
societal regulation: "It is possible, because of its indirect social or
moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent
for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which
the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a
few."53  Mr. Justice Black's United States v. Von's Grocery Co.54
value judgment in favor of the "mom and popism" of the neighbor-
hood store was in the social purpose tradition. In drafting the ma-
jority opinion which struck down a horizontal merger that would
have resulted in 7.5 percent horizontal market control, Mr. Justice
Black's remark echoed Judge Learned Hand: "Like the Sherman Act
-in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose of the 1950
Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the
American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors
in business."'55
The impact of judgmental estimates like these cannot be ignored.
There is, however, an important neutralizing factor. Over the
years the judiciary has created and nourished a body of decisional
guidelines - a set of analytical tools, some drawn from economics"
- employed to resolve conflicts in a manner that permits the courts
5 0 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass.),
afl'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
51 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927).
52 Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 130 (1948).
5 3 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
54 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
551d. at 275.
56 Some observers say that there is too much reliance on economic theory. Mc-
Daniel, Antitrust and the Status Quo in a Changing Society, 1967 N.Y. ST. B. ASs'N
ANTiTRusT L. SYMPOSIUM 1, 4; Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Preview -
1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1679-80 (1967).
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to maintain contact with a rational decisional framework cemented
by a commitment to imposing remedial restraints only when the auto-
matic mechanisms of the marketplace are disrupted or endangered.
The inquiry focuses on two issues: First, a determination of the
extent and character of market disruptions; second, a decision, in
light of findings on the first issue, on whether proscription is nec-
essary to restore the competitive balance. 7  Where horizontal and
vertical mergers are concerned, measurements on market share,
foreclosure, and concentration are employed to make readings on the
probability of competitive effects. 58  These indicators have a re-
straining effect on the judiciary, serving to prevent a headlong
plunge into ad hoc particularism and a morass of value judgments.
An ingrained commitment to operating within the boundaries of
the policy of the antitrust laws has kept the judiciary within earshot
of Congress' call for relating proscription to actual or probable
competitive effects. In essence, counterbalances exist that reduce
significantly the chances of extreme dosages of value judgments
surfacing frequently enough to take on the cast of permanent pro-
scriptive guides.
Where the legality of a conglomerate merger is at issue, how-
ever, the efficacy and the restraining features of the traditional pat-
terns of analysis are rendered useless. As to existing standards,
conglomeration stands neuter. Recent guidelines - reciprocity,
potential competition, etc. - are relevant too infrequently to be of
significant value. Yet by statute and by case law, courts are re-
quired to scrutinize all mergers against the lessening of competi-
tion standard. As Mr. Justice'Douglas said: "All mergers are within
the reach of § 7, and all must be tested by the same standard,
whether they are classified as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate.or
other." 9  This leads the judiciary directly into a dosed-ended di-
lemma: If they refuse to view conglomerate mergers as totally alien
to antitrust analysis, courts commit themselves to a journey through
uncharted waters where, of necessity, resort must be made to .value
judgments.
57 Some offenses, such as price fixing, are presumed to produce anticompetitive
effects and are proscribed per se. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958).
5 8 
"Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition' ... to indi-
cate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties." Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
59 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
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A. judicial Value Judgments on Conglomerate Mergers:
A Case in Point
A stark profile of the multidimensional consequences which
underwrite the conglomerate drama is documented in the recent
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,
Inc. case.60 The line of attack adopted by the "aggressor" company,
White, was to gain an initial foothold by buying 31.2 percent of
the outstanding Allis stock, with the intention of later cementing
the acquisition with a tender offer. A defiant Allis resisted with a
suit seeking to enjoin the tender offer on the basis that consumma-
tion of the merger would violate Clayton 7.61 In a two-to-one de-
cision, the Third Circuit proscribed the merger and granted Allis
relief based on four reasons: (1) Product extension effects; (2)
reciprocal trading; (3) elimination of potential competition; and
(4) certain other effects.
A White subsidiary, Blaw-Knox, manufactures steel rolling mills.
Blaw-Knox controls 20 percent of the market, making it the third
largest firm in an oligopoly where the top four firms control 80
percent of the market. The cost of producing a completed mill is
allocable to three sources: (1) Design, construction, and building;
(2) electrical drives and controls; and (3) "other" equipment.
Electrical drives and controls are not manufactured by the mill
manufacturers but are purchased from six firms - General Electric
Co., with a 45 percent share of the market, Westinghouse Electric
Corp., with 40 percent, Allis with 6 percent, and three others with
5 percent, 3 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. The court reasoned
that product extension consequences were likely. The putative
merger would afford Blaw-Knox access to the Allis electrical con-
trols, thus creating a package deal to steel producing customers
which would result in raising barriers around the steel rolling mill
80414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1970).
61 The conflict started on December 6, 1968, when White acquired 31.2 percent of
the outstanding stock of Allis from Gulf & Western. Twelve days later Allis filed its
complaint seeking a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. An ex
parte temporary restraining order prohibiting White from pursuing its takeover ef-
forts was issued by the district court. On January 22, 1969, the court denied the motion
for a preliminary injunction because there was "no showing of reasonable probability
of success on final trial of the anti-trust allegations .... " Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263, 1268 (D. Del. 1969). In addition to
preventing an immediate takeover, Allis wanted time to solicit aid, reorganize its cor-
porate structure, and effect image-enhancing accounting changes. See FORBES, Aug. 1,
1969, at 22; FORTtNE, May 15, 1969, at 234.
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manufacturing industry.6  "The potential entrenchment of the
market power of a merged Allis-Chalmers-White industrial com-
plex as a 'full-line manufacturer' in the field of metal rolling mach-
inery is an example of 'product extension' consequences which may
be anticompetitive .. ."63
Allis' yearly steel purchases average $44 million, $30 million
of which is purchased from the 10 steel companies that buy mills
from Blaw-Knox. Such a pressure, reinforced by White's annual
steel purchases of $42 million, would produce a structural environ-
ment "conducive to reciprocal trading." 4  The court surmised that
the mere existence of this purchasing power would be sufficient to
induce steel companies to buy mills from Blaw-Knox. 5
Allis argued that the merger would eliminate them as a potential
competitor of Blaw-Knox. Three factors were cited in support of
this position: (1) Allis manufactured components and sub-assem-
blies used by Blaw-Knox; (2) there was evidence that Blaw-Knox
had expressed the opinion that Allis possessed the capacity to manu-
facture 10- or 12-inch mills; (3) Allis was in the process of negoti-
ating with a foreign firm for a license which would enable them
to manufacture machinery capable of producing the same end pro-
ducts as produced by the Blaw-Knox mills.66 The court apparently
agreed with the Allis-Chalmers' position, holding that "further
inquiry into Allis' status as a potential entrant into this industry is
necessary.
' '1
7
The court touched on two additional points. Concern was ex-
pressed over the possibility that Allis, as a leading manufacturer of
road construction equipment and asphalt pavers, would use its
marketing experience and dealer contacts in these fields to sell
asphalt plants manufactured by Blaw-Knox. Also discerned by the
62The court noted the "already significant barriers to the entry of others into the
various segments of the metal rolling mill market." 414 F.2d at 518.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 It was on the single issue of reciprocal trading that Judge Seitz concurred. He
based his conclusion on an affidavit of Allis' general manager who stated that none of
Blaw-Knox's rivals approached the $30 million worth of steel purchased annually by
Allis. Id. at 526 (concurring opinion).
66The dissent questioned the factual correctness of all three conclusions. As to
the first point, Judge Aldisert noted that the only support for Allis' claim was that they
sold "two heavy-duty tool container block assemblies for use at Alcoa on helicopter
blades as a sub-contract with Blaw-Knox." Id. at 534 (dissenting opinion). As to
point two, the dissent implied that supportive data was nonexistent. The third point
relied upon by Judge Stahl was described as drawn from "a vague self-serving declara-
tion by one of Allis' officers." Id.
671d. at 514.
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court was a vertical relationship. Allis, as a manufacturer of cone
and gyratory crushers and grinding mills, uses steel castings. Since
White produces steel castings and is presently one of Allis' suppliers,
the court suggested that a merger would result in foreclosing
White's competitors from the Allis market.
The court's difficulty in isolating and identifying areas of com-
petitive disruption serves to erect around it the walls of a dilemma.
The product extension relationships made possible by the merger
fail to produce discernible negative competitive effects. Economists
and court decisions (at least until Allis-Chalmers) do not automati-
cally attribute undesirable consequences to product extension mer-
gers.68 A change in the coloration of the antitrust litmus paper de-
pends upon the coalescence of three factors: (1) The merger results
in "node commonality," i.e., "the potential for performing an ac-
tivity more efficiently as a merged firm than as two separate en-
tities;"6 9 (2) one of the firms has the resource capacity to effect a
meaningful transfer of power; and (3) a market structure exists in
which the power transmittal would produce undesirable effects
either internally (the acquired firm draws from its new resource
base to "undercut and ravage the less affluent competition"7 ) or
externally (i.e., raising barriers to entry).
As to the particulars of "node commonality," the court proceeded
no further than a bland definitional conclusion.71 Analysis of the
leverage resource base was equally sparse. Given the extent of
control that each had in its respective market - Blaw-Knox's
market share of 20 percent and Allis' 6 percent share - the
capacity of either to effectively transfer power with noticeable re-
6 8 Indeed it is possible that the capacity to offer a full line of equipment might
benefit consumers - and presumably would heighten competition. Moreover, it is
possible that the products involved are highly complementary so that economies of
scale in production, distribution, selling, or management are achfeved. Turner the-
orizes that efficiency-creating mergers can be procompetitive in two ways: "First, they
make it less costly for a firm to enter, thereby promoting entry that otherwise might
not take place; and second, they give promise of putting added pressures on other firms
to improve their economic performance." Turner, supra note 9, at 1328.
69 Narver, supra note 9, at 5.
70 Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
71414 F.2d at 518. Two of the cases cited for support involved a form of "node
commonality" obviously lacking in a steel rolling mill, electrical control, and drive
relationship. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), and General
Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cit. 1967), promotional advantages, particularly
in advertising, allegedly resulted from the complementary nature of the products. In
the other case cited, United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Corp., 288 F. Supp. 543
(E.D. Ill. 1968), the court looked to Wilson's credit and distribution influence over
thousands of retailers. If, in the Allis-Chalmers case, distribution node commonality
existed, the court failed to describe it. See Davidow, supra note 9, at 1269.
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suits appears both improbable and unlikely. 72 The deep-pocket argu-
ment is likewise inappropriate. Any challenge by Allis in the
electrical drive and control market would not go unnoticed by Gen-
eral Electric and Westinghouse which, as conglomerates, would
presumably have deep-pocket resources of their own and could be
expected to fend off any "full-line" efforts by Blaw-Knox and Allis.
Conversely, and this demonstrates the susceptibility of conglomer-
ate evaluation to forced conclusions, it could be argued that the
merger would have the procompetitive effect of disturbing the
leadership position of General Electric and Westinghouse, thus
lending more symmetry to the market structure .7  These same crit-
icisms are equally applicable to the court's conclusions regarding
the product extension effects of connecting Allis' road construction
equipment trade with Blaw-Knox's asphalt plant business.74
The reciprocity analysis is even more tenuous. None of the
usual threshold questions were explored. No mention was made of
either the presence of an intent to engage in the practice or a past
history of reciprocity by either firm. The conclusion on "con-
ducive structure" was not supported by the type of examination
conducted in Consolidated Foods,75 the case used as supportive
authority. The foreclosure potential that would come from the 10
Blaw-Knox customers against whom the purchasing power would be
directed was not calculated. Nor was the capacity of these cus-
tomers to resist leverage discussed. No competitive effect projec-
tion was estimated from Blaw-Knox's share of the market and no
interest was expressed in ascertaining the likelihood that reciprocity
pressures would lead to structural alterations. Likewise, the bald
assumption that the mere existence of purchasing power itself is suf-
ficient to promote unilateral decisions on the part of suppliers to
reciprocate purchases was unattended by further -inquiry.76
72 As the dissent pointed our, the Allis-White market share figures do not conform
to FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (acquiring firm controlled over
50 percent of the complementary marker, acquired company, 48.8 percent); General
Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 937-38 (3d Cir. 19.67) (acquiring firm, "S.O.S.,
one of the largest producers," 51 percent overall; "monop9ly position in many areas");
and United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Corp., 288 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Ill. 1968)
(Wilson, "the nation's most prominent producer and marketer of sporting goods"
acquiring the "leading manufacturer and seller of gymnasium equipment in the coun-
try."). 414 F.2d at 536-37. See Davidow, supra note 9, at 1253.
7 3 Turner, supra note 9, at 1367.
74 414 F.2d at 537 n.21.
7 5 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). See Austin, A Survey
of the Problems Encountered in Combating Reciprocal Trading Under Existing Trade
Regulation Laws, 41 IND. LJ. 165 (1966).
76
"Clearly the opportunity for reciprocity is not alone enough to invalidate a
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Even when dealing with the question of potential competition
- perhaps the most speculative and elastic concept developed
since conspiracy, and certainly the quickest avenue to conglomerate
proscription - the struggle to stretch points of contact between
the merging firms into the calculus of anticompetitive effects is ap-
parent. Departing from prior potential competition decisions, the
court relied mainly on subjective indicia. Objective criteria, such
as the possession of the necessary technical resources, the existence
of an adequate financial base,7  the managerial capacity, and the
proclivity toward market entry, coupled with an evaluation of Allis'
impact as an independent entrant on market structure and pricing,
were ignored. The existence, the distance from the edge of the
market, and the possible entrance of other firms were similarly
overlooked.
In glossing over these points, the court ignored its earlier con-
clusion reached in the product extension analysis that "significant
barriers to entry"78 already circumscribed the metal rolling mill in-
dustry. In addition to suggesting an analytical contradiction or
oversight, this conclusion raises two points of relevance: (1) The
higher the barriers to entry, the greater the resources needed to
break through the wall; (2) paired against "significant" barriers,
does Allis exert meaningful "potential competition" pressures on
the firms in the rolling mill market ?7  Are the pressures strong
enough to justify preservation of Allis as a separate entity? Absent
an examination of these issues and given its failure to answer the
other questions posed above, the court's potential competition analy-
sis constitutes either a journey into speculation or a preface to value
judgments.
merger under § 7. The Clayton Act was not passed to outlaw diversification." FTC
v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 603 (1965) (Stewart, J., concurring).
The court could have explored another point, i.e., whether White employed the "profit
center" concept. See note 15 supra. It is interesting to note that Allis, in its program
of revitalization, has adopted with much publicity the profit center method. See Allis'
full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal, Fri., Oct. 10, 1969, at 13.
77There is some evidence indicating that Allis was not in a financial position to
take on the new burdens of expansion. FORBES, Aug. 1, 1969, at 22; FORTUNE, May
15, 1969, at 234.
78414 F.2d at 518. See note 62 supra & accompanying text.
79 The Supreme Court has described the rationale of the potential competition doc-
trine as follows:
[P)otential competition . .. as a substitute for [actual competition] may re-
strain producers from overcharging those to whom they sell or underpaying
those from whom they buy .... Potential competition, insofar as the threat
survives . . . may compensate in part for the imperfection characteristic of ac-
tual competition in the great majority of competitive markets. United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964).
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The point that Allis-Chalmers brings home is that judicial con-
frontation with the conglomerate merger carries with it the likeli-
hood that judgmental variables of unknown quantity and quality
will seep into antitrust jurisprudence.8 0 The inference is clear that
value judgments have been rendered on questions beyond the scope
of antitrust inquiry. In the face of an absence of a set of responsive
evaluative guidelines for reaching, much less measuring, competi-
tive effects, the court nevertheless does set forth a conclusory sched-
ule of adverse consequences. In Allis-Chalmers, any doubts as to
the court's tendencies on this point were removed when Judge Stahl
expressly adopted, with extensive quotation, the FTC's version of
conglomerate transcendentalism set forth in a complaint to be filed
against White:
There is a vital connecting link between growing aggregate concen-
tration and the market power conferred by concentration in indi-
vidual markets. Many of the largest conglomerate corporations
occupy leading positions in numerous industries, particularly the
most concentrated ones. These positions confer economic power
and potential economic advantage beyond that associated i,'lh sheer
bigness alone.8 '
80 A warning against the use of a subjective test for ascertaining potential com-
petition was issued by the Supreme Court in Penn-Olin. See Davidow, supra note 9,
at 1244.
81414 F.2d at 523 (emphasis added). On the issue of "conglomerate bigness"
the dissent said:
This hypothesis is nothing more than a restatement of a "Brandeisian bias
in favor of human sized institutions," a nostalgic attempt to equate bigness
with badness. But Congress has not written this theory into its anti-trust
legislation; nor should any court attempt to legislate such a doctrine into it.
So long as the legislative proscription of anti-trust activities turns on factors
beyond the mere "possibilities" of anti-competitive effects, the courts must
be diligent not to substitute the Brandeisian bias for sound analysis. Id. at
538.
Senator Hruska says: "[O]ver-all concentration does not seem to me to have much
if any relationship to competition within a particular industry. It is difficult to see
how competition can be studied unless we look at particular products and markets
rather than gross figures by themselves." Hruska, supra note 9, at 195.
The Justice Department has recently developed its own version of "aggregate tran-
scendentalism." In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962), Mr.
Justice Warren stated that one of the cluster of factors bearing on the probability of a
lessening of competition in a relevant market was whether the merger occurred or was
to occur in a market "that had seen a recent trend toward domination by a few leaders."
Complaints recently filed by the Justice Department indicate that the "trend toward con-
centration in a particular market" standard has been expanded to a "trend of mergers in
the aggregate" standard. The latter test has been expressed in the following terms:
The current trend of mergers of large firms will be furthered and encour-
aged, thereby (i) increasing the concentration of control of manufacturing
assets, (ii) reducing the number of firms capable of entering concentrated
markets, (iii) reducing the number of firms with the capability and incentive
for competitive innovation, (iv) increasing the barriers to entry in concen-
trated markets, and (v) diminishing the vigor of competition by increasing
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The range of value judgments is not restricted to visceral assump-
tions on the evils of aggregate concentration. Allis-Chalmers dem-
onstrates the probability of the surfacing of a species of corporate
"protectionism" 
- a Monroe Doctrine for "good" companies, keyed
to new values such as "freedom from aggression" or a right to
"corporate independence" from raiders. Unquestionably, the Allis-
Chalmers court made more than a feint in this direction when it
stated: "Basically what is at stake . . . is the life or death of Allis,
a viable independent company, eager to continue as such, pitted
against White, an aggressive, fast-moving acquirer of many diverse
businesses. . . . To deny preliminary relief could very well mean
the end of the road for appellant as an independent economic
entity." 82
The drift into conclusory subjectivism has particular signifi-
cance to preliminary injunction actions. In a private action for
injunctive relief the plaintiff must establish sequentially a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws83 and then show that if the injunction is
not issued he will suffer irreparable harm. 4 When the plaintiff is
seeking to enjoin a conglomerate merger the difficulties confronting
the court in making a satisfactory determination on the first require-
ment are manifest. As a result, courts are likely to change the
sequence of analysis and focus initially on the irreparable harm
issue. Consequently, factors such as the effects of a takeover on
"professional and management employee recruitment, morale and
performance"85 of the target company will emerge as the prime
determinants of the action, obliterating the antitrust violation issue.
actual and potential customer-supplier relationships among leading firms in
concentrated markets. United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., Complaint of
B.F. Goodrich Co., Civil No. 69-C1102, at para. 39(d) (N.D. 1., filed May
21, 1969).
For a similar clause, see United States v. Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc., Complaint of
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Civil No. 69-438, at para. 33(c) (W.D. Pa., filed April
14, 1969). For a discussion of some dangers in reading too much into concentration
figures, and for an analysis of the differences between concentration in a particular in-
dustry and "megacorp" concentration, see Rose, Bigness is a Nucm bers Game, FORTUNE,
Nov. 1969, at 113.
82414 F.2d at 525.
83 Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964) provides:
[A~ny person . .. shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief ...
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ... when
and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief ... is granted
by courts of equity ....
84Maclntyre, Antitrust Injunction: A Flexible Private Remedy, 1966 DUKE L.J.
22; Note, Preliminary Injunctions and the Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
40 N.Y.U.L REV. 771 (1965).
8 414 F.2d at 515-16.
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Allis-Chalmers is an open window to the analytical approach
provoked by the conglomerate mystique.86 Structuring of indus-
trial society will coincide with a particular court's perspective of
the peculiar "equities" of the acquisition. Methods of takeover, the
form and degree of resistance offered by the target company, the
impact on personnel or on customers, methods of financing, plus a
myriad of other factors, will emerge as vital influences on pro-
scription. Moreover, in embarking on this course, courts are ignor-
ing the congressional mandate to bar only those mergers that raise
the probability of disruptive effects on competition sufficient enough
to justify prohibition. Finally, the wide choice of value judgments
available to the judiciary and the absence of a transcending point
of reference render it unlikely that forthcoming decisions will mani-
fest anything close to a sense of regularity and predictability.
B. Administrative Agency Control of the Marketplace
It is becoming increasingly evident that in government-instituted
antitrust suits holdings of illegality are close to inevitable.87 Mr.
Justice Stewart once complained that the only consistency that he
could discern in Clayton 7 litigation was that "the Government
always wins. '88  The experience of sifting through a maze of com-
plex facts and relating findings to decisional constraints has had
perhaps a cumulative effect on the judiciary.89  Courts have ap-
parently adopted, albeit subconsciously, the theory that if the govern-
ment investigates and analyzes market data and then files suit, it is
logical and easier to begin scrutiny under a presumption of illegal-
86 The denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of White's petition for appeal en-
larges the significance of the Third Circuit's treatment of the conglomerate merger.
414 F.2d 506, cert. denied, 38 U.S!.W. 3254 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1970). The Wall Street
Journal commented:
Even though the one-line order, in a case involving Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing Co., is unlikely to be the court's last word on the conglomerate con-
troversy, it was greeted with enthusiasm by Government antitrusters. Richard
W. McLaren, head of the Justice Departmenes Antitrust Division, said that
"psychologically, this may have an effect' on Federal judges who thus far
have taken a dim view of his anticonglomerate drive. Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 13, 1970, at 4, col. 7.
87 Some observers feel that proscription is mechanical. Cook, Merger Law and Big
Business: A Look Ahead, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 710 (1965); Sullivan, Politics, Planning
and Trade Regulation: A Glance Toward An Emerging Utopia, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1
(1968).
8 8 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
89 One noticeable effect of antitrust complexity is an increasing reliance on economic
theory to bridge the gap between "facts" and adverse competitive "effects." Austin,
supra note 7, at 742.
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ity. The pressures, mostly non-antitrust, accruing from conglomera-
tion are magnifying this impression. There is an unarticulated
tendency to assume that tipping the balance in favor of illegality
would, at worst, maintain the existing balances of power and, at
best, conceivably improve the competitive environment. The at-
traction of "being on the safe side" increases in inverse proportion
to the dearth of relevant decisional guidelines.
The possibility is extremely remote that the judiciary will exer-
cise restraint by imposing sanctions only after making a meaning-
ful search for a probability of a lessening of competition. The
cascade of demands for action, the diversity of its sources (e.g., the
unusual coalition of business and labor),90 along with the persistent
prompting from the government, will continue its influence in
shaping the courts' treatment of conglomeration. The unlikelihood
of a detached competitive effect interpretation of the antitrust
laws is compounded by the possibility of a curious ad hoc alliance
between the Justice Department or the FTC and some of the target
companies. When a target company is resisting a takeover and at
the same time the government takes action against the aggressor an
atypical adversarial milieu is created. Two of the three parties in
the action are out to prevent the merger. It is obvious that under
these conditions the government can count upon the target company
to serve as a bountiful source of mutually self-serving testimony."
This type of evidence, i.e., the views of corporate officials, would
have a crucial effect on all issues, but particularly on elusive and
subjective points such as reciprocity (or reciprocity "effect") and
potential competition.92
Even when not working in partnership with the government,
the pressures exerted by the resisting target company could play a
significant role in decreasing the likelihood of judicial restraint.
While generally encouraged, private antitrust enforcement has been
deterred in the Clayton 7 area because of the difficulty of proving
damages and the length of litigation. Since these impediments do
90 To facilitate bargaining, labor unions prefer dealing with large firms in concen-
trated industries. The atomistic structure of the conglomerate firm makes it difficult
to exert leverage. A strike against a single subsidiary representing a low portion of
the firm's profits provides a low base for pressure.
91 Another possibility is that the target company might have the benefit of a pend-
ing government suit. For the dissent's view on the effect of this possibility, see 414
F.2d at 530.
92The Supreme Court has cautioned against reliance on "lay evidence" from rivals
on so complex an economic-legal problem as the substantiality of the effect" of the
merger. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963).
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not exist where injunctive relief is sought, increased Clayton 7 pri-
vate action can be expected. In seeking injunctive relief, the target
company resembles an extra-governmental antitrust agency. The
line of attack adopted by the targets will be more aggressive than
that of the government, because, with the vested interest of survival
at stake,93 the management of the resisting firm would overwhelm
the court with every conceivable line of argumentation. Hence, any
gaps in attack theories overlooked by the government or left open
because of policy reasons would be filled in by the target companies.
This foretells a consistent series of victories for the govern-
ment, making litigation a battleground of dilatory tactics reminis-
cent of Charles Dickens' Bleak House. The likelihood of consis-
tently successful anticonglomerate litigation, effectuated by the
demise of meaningful judicial implementation of the antitrust laws
as they relate to mergers, will localize immense new powers of lever-
age in the executive branch.94 To be sure, the various arms of
the executive branch already possess significant means to shape the
general mood of the economy and to affect trends of industrial
growth in particular areas - the very presence of office exudes the
power to influence. Specific methods, such as tax policies, distri-
bution of defense spending, the selection of personnel to head the
agencies, along with other techniques, can be employed to shape
and institute economic policy, but these methods are at best oblique
in thrust. The varying intensity of commitment to implement these
techniques and the fact that their efficacy is frequently diluted by
pressures unrelated to economic planning and organization reduces
their range of impact. On the other hand, when, as a result of
automatic proscription, the courts transfer decision making re-
sponsibilities to the FTC and the Justice Department the conse-
quence is the creation of a new power unencumbered by diluting
intrusions. In particular, it is a type of restructuring power that is
9 3 Management's instinct for survival cannot be underestimated. Peter Drucker
contends that corporate survival, not profit maximization, is the firm's basic objective.
H. ANSOFF, CORPORATE STRATEGY 33 (1965).
94 It should be noted that there exists a fairly widespread view that the issues raised
by antitrust cannot be adequately treated in an adversarial system. Elman, Rulemaking
Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1964).
Mr. Justice Jackson once remarked:
I regard it as unfortunate that the Clayton Act submits such economic issues
to judicial determination. It not only leaves the law vague as a warning or
guide, and determined only after the event, but the judicial process is not well
adapted to exploration of such industry-wide and even nation-wide questions.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 322 (1948) (dissenting
opinion).
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unencumbered by antitrust constraints. Antitrust evaluative con-
siderations would become, at best, a secondary influence in what-
ever decisions are made in industrial restructuring. Instead, the
direction and character of the structuring process would be molded
by political and social value judgments. 5  This absence of dilutive
effects provides the executive branch with the capability of effect-
ing immediate, direct, and far-reaching transformations in the in-
dustrial topography.
Replacing the competition preserving orientation of antitrust
with the shifting and vacillating tides of social and political judg-
ments would obviously constitute a fundamental departure from
the traditional perspective; it is certainly a departure which would
raise some significant issues. The ad hoc creation of norms for
industrial conduct and economic development, bypassing Congress
in the process, violates entrenched constitutional principles of pre-
determined allocation of governmental responsibility. Along with
usurping congressional prerogatives, the executive branch, in its
evaluation of the success of corporate groups or individuals in
satisfying its norms, would be functioning as an extra-judicial body.
To those affected, due process safeguards - the right to an open
hearing, an opportunity to rebut, and access to appeal - inherent in
the adversary system would be unavailable."'
The ephemeral cadence of political and social judgments unfet-
tered by the restraints of established enforcement standards would
impose formidable problems of planning on the business commu-
nity. Anticipation and preparation would be hindered by the omni-
presence of a plethora of competing value judgments; dashes would
thus be frequent, and the results - both over the short and long
run - would be quite indecisive. Agreement on social priorities
is always hard to attain even, or particularly, within political parties.
Changes in administrations would precipitate automatic changes in
the velocity and direction of leverage. 7 Moreover, the routes for
curing economic and social ills are diverse and susceptible to ac-
commodating many positions. Segments of the economy would
95 For a discussion of this consequence, see Cook and Sullivan, supra note 87.
96 Sullivan, supra note 87, at 34.
97 Some commentators hold the view that the crackdown on conglomerates is polit-
ically motivated. The theory is that the Republican administration is attacking only
those conglomerates headed by large contributors to the Democratic party. The Cleve-
land Pxess, July 11, 1969, at C-11, col. 7. Another view is that some conglomerates
owe much to defense contracts and are therefore part of the military-industrial com-
plex. Segal, The Time of the Conglomerates, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1968, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 151.
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compete in endeavoring to obtain unofficial exemption from the
imposition of executive leverage. All of this adds up to a surreal-
istic bent heretofore unknown in the public regulation of the econ-
omy.
C. Conglomerate Legislation: Acquisition Determinism
Any prediction on the enactment of new legislation must take
into account the realities of contemporary merger methodology.
The effect of nuances yet to be discovered growing out of an
acquisition technique that only recently has been fully exploited
renders it impossible for the courts to rationally fulfill their dele-
gatory responsibilities under the "may be substantially to lessen
competition" norm. Hence, by necessity, Congress would have to
create new criteria for proscription. Whatever standards emerge
will constitute a dear value judgment on industrial bigness. It is,
therefore, the type of value judgment that is bound to provoke
controversy and to arouse the vigorous energy of diverse pressure
groups each espousing its own particular plan for antitrust salva-
tion. The pressure for legislation must, therefore, be strong enough
to overcome the politician's intuitive reluctance to expose himself
to the unpredictable crosscurrents of a controversial issue.
There are signs, however, that the vibrations from a distraught
business community have pricked the ever sensitive congressional
political antennae. The House Antitrust Subcommittee recently
initiated hearings on conglomeration.98 Both the Johnson and
Nixon administrations solicited reports from blue-ribbon groups."
Academicians persist in a barrage of commentary, adding to the
ever present chant for antitrust reform. 00 Consequently, an argu-
ment could be made that the pressures are crystallizing to a point
where it is now advisable to anticipate the range and character of
the options that Congress would be prone to follow if the enact-
ment stage is reached.
It is safe to assume that Congress would be unwilling to take
the drastic and impolitic course of imposing blanket strictures on all
98 N.Y. Times, July 31, 1969, at 45, col. 2. See BNA ANITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 403 (April 1, 1969).
99 STIGLER REPORT, supra note 20; NEAL REPORT, supra note 19. The FTC just
recently released its Economic Report on Corporate Mergers, BNA ANTIThuST &
TRADE REG. REP. A-22 (Nov. 4, 1969).
100 Much of the clamor for reform is directed toward the FTC. See REPORT OF THE
ABA CoMM. To STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM' (1969). The fact that many
of the antitrust laws, such as the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.,§ 13a (1964), are
not consistent with the purposes of antitrust causes some of the pressure for reform.
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merger activity. Corporate merger celibacy would satisfy few and
antagonize a multitude. Even the most zealous of economic planners
would hesitate to deny that mergers can have salutary competitive
consequences and in some instances, such as a failing company
situation, might be a welcome necessity.101 Just as unlikely is legis-
lation in the mold of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,'
0 2
where firms operating in unrelated fields seeking to merge would
be required to obtain permission from an agency. Since the Justice
Department and the FTC are in the process of gaining (if they do
not already possess) powers similar in scope, the redundancy of this
approach is apparent, 103  Given this background the probability is
that Congress would chart a drafting path that would strike a
balance between a complete merger embargo and the present mode
of attack. The inevitable result of this balancing process would
101 Nationalization would be the most extreme remedy. Professor Galbraith rec-
ommends that firms specializing in government defense work be nationalized. Gal-
braith, The Big Defense Firms Are Really Public Firms and Should Be Nationalized,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 50. This would effect those con-
glomerates, such as Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc., having divisions engaged in defense
work.
1 02 The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1964).
Section 11 of this act gives the SEC the power to:
limit the operations of the holding company system.., to a single integrated
public utility system, and to such other businesses as are reasonably incidental,
or economically necessary or appropriate to the operations of such integrated
public-utility system: Provided, however, that the Commission shall permit a
registered holding company to continue to control one or more additional
integrated public utility systems, if, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
it finds that-
(A) Each of such additional systems cannot be operated as an independent
system without the loss of substantial economies which can be secured by
the retention of control by such holding company of such system;
(B) All of such additional systems are located in one State, or in adjoin-
ing States, or in a contiguous foreign country; and
(C) The continued combination of such systems under the control of such
holding company is not so large (considering the state of the art and the
area or region affected) as to impair the advantages of localized management,
efficient operation, or the effectiveness of regulation.
The Commission may permit as reasonably incidental, or economically
necessary or appropriate to the operations of one or more integrated public-
utility systems the retention of an interest in any business (other than the
business of a public-utility company as such) which the Commission shall
find necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors or consumers and not detrimental to the proper functioning of such
system or systems. Id. § 79k.
See Trienens, The Utility Act as a Solution to Sherman Act Problems, 44 ILL. L REv.
331 (1949).
103 Also unlikely ever to receive congressional approval is Turner's recommenda-
tion that the top 50 or 100 firms be required to spin off assets comparable to those ob-
tained in an acquisition. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and the Future, 37 ANTITRuST
L.J. 318, 344 (1968).
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be an endeavor to develop a systematic plan of channeling the
conglomeration urge into predetermined niches.
The most logical and feasible method of effecting merger de-
terminism is to set up an acquisition flow scheme keyed to a
structural frame of reference. Benchmark levels of sales, assets,
and market shares would delineate the permissible range of acquisi-
tion opportunities. Thus a firm with assets, sales, or a market share
which exceeded certain levels would be permitted to acquire only
firms with sales, assets, or market shares under a specified level.
This is the approach adopted in the Neal Report, 04 where it was
recommended that Congress enact laws precluding mergers between
"large" firms (sales exceeding $500 million or assets exceeding
$250 million) and "leading" firms (companies whose market shares
exceed 10 percent and which are part of a group of four concerns
controlling 50 percent of the market) 105
This is a relatively convenient approach, capable of removing
from the shoulders of the judiciary much of the present analytical
burden. Focusing on market structure is compatible with the cur-
rent view that structure plays a significant, if not dominant, role
in determining the level of competitive vigor. 06 It is also likely
that acquisition engineering would engender a degree of support
from the academic community. Another attractive feature of this
form of legislation springs from the rationale that in addition to
containing conglomeration legislative guidelines would have a re-
habilitative effect on market structures. The assumption is that the
conglomerator would enter the market himself or that his power and
energy, channeled into an acquired "small" and "underprivileged"
firm, would instill the urge and capacity to challenge larger firms.
This would produce realignments of market shares - the ultimate
consequence being a more symmetrical structure.
Beyond the philosophical conflict over its debilitating impact
1 04 NEAL REPORT, Appendix B, Merger Act, supra note 19, at 5651. Under a
similar recommendation "leading-firm conglomerate mergers" would be presumptively
unlawful. Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate Mergers, 13 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 1361, 1363 (1968). This rule would embrace mergers where the ac-
quiring and the acquired firms are among the four largest in at least one concentrated
industry (four firms control 40 percent of the market) large enough to be significant
(assets of at least $100 million).
105 NEAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 5652.
106 See J. BAIN, BARRERs TO NEW COMPETITION (1965); R. CAVEs, AMEmCAN
INDUSTRY: STRucruRE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANcE (rev. ed. 1967); C. KAYSEN & D.
TuRNER, ANTITRUST Pouicy: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs (1965); Brod-
ley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Act - From Economic Theory
to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L REv. 285 (1967).
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on business initiative, acquisition determinism raises a number of
issues. Needless to say, setting up acceptable standards of "large"
and "small" is a formidable task. This is new ground with little
more to serve as guidelines than the a priori meanderings of com-
mentators and Fortune magazine's annual list of the "500 largest."
Statistical data is often unavailable and frequently unreliable.' °
Another problem is that shifting the emphasis to measuring assets,
sales, and market shares does not totally dispense with analytical
problems. The intricacies and the fast-paced technologies of to-
day's marketplace makes rote and mechanical measurement of these
three elements virtually impossible. For example, mass media tech-
niques are constantly being utilized in an increasingly sophisticated
manner to create intense interindustry competition between osten-
sibly distinguishable products. 108
There is no assurance that large companies would respond as
theorized. Firms might upset the grand design by shifting empha-
sis to foreign growth areas. And, of course, there is always the
possibility - or probability, depending upon one's view - that in
terms of overall economic development this method of attacking
the problem would prove disastrous. 9 It is, for example, impos-
sible to anticipate the reaction of the investment market. Finally,
there is an odor of unfairness in creating an environment in which
some firms are shielded from takeover while others are by statute
relegated to a state of perpetual vulnerability to acquisition. Such
a grouping would obviously have great impact on managerial ini-
tiative, recruitment, policy and planning, and on the general com-
petitive climate of the market itself. There is the ironical possibil-
ity that the government would have in effect subsidized a "quiet
life" for many large and perhaps moribund corporations.
At this point, it is inappropriate to engage in in-depth amplifi-
tory analysis on the issues briefly described in the preceding para-
graphs. It would be necessary to depend upon precise assumptions
1 07 See F. MACKLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 475-87 (1967).
108 E.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) ("Meaningful
competition" between glass and metal containers created by advertising). See Austin,
Antitrust Proscription and the Mass Media, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1021.
109 Professor Bork, a member of Task Force on Antitrust Policy (Neal Committee),
argued that since the choice of a target company is dictated by estimates of efficiency
potential the acquisition engineering recommended by the Neal Report "will either
shift the acquisition to a less preferred firm, causing a decrease in the efficiencies real-
ized, or cause the abandonment of any plan to acquire a unit in that industry, causing a
complete loss of expected efficiencies." The net result is a loss of efficiencies, a loss
ultimately borne by the consumer. Separate Statement of Robert H. Bork, NEAL RE-
PORT, supra note 19, at 5658.
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that defy reasonable prediction. Moreover, such an exercise would
only peripheralize the real significance of merger determinism. To
permanentize a priori assumptions on aggregate concentration
would dearly constitute a sharp break with present antitrust policy.
It would mean a repudiation of the premise that the marketplace
can (and should) by self-direction efficiently allocate its resources
and thereby transfer savings to the public. Participation by the
government would no longer descend in response to specific prob-
lems. It would also mean repudiation of the notion that economic
theory, contoured into a legal framework, can serve as an anticipa-
tory seismograph of competitive disturbances. The most important
implication of acquisition engineering is that it represents a signifi-
cant extension of governmental regulation into a sector of the econ-
omy that has been relatively free from close surveillance and control.
Indeed, the line of demarcation between the public utility sector
and the "free" sector would be fragile.
V. CONCLUSION
The obstinacy of reality indicates that of the three areas of im-
pact - the judiciary, the executive branch, the legislature - con-
glomerate pressures are likely to cause the most serious transforma-
tions in the first two fields. Materialization of new legislation ap-
pears unlikely. Inherent congressional anathema of abrupt change
of policy is reinforced by the present administration's obvious in-
clination to rely on an assumed elasticity of present laws to deal
with the problem.110 Undoubtedly, the recent trend of decisions
has encouraged confidence in this attitude."' As for the other two
areas, reality points to the conclusion that the pattern of effects
projected above will continue inexorably uninterrupted. The fact
that the antitrust laws, even with their proven scope, simply do not
touch conglomeration assures the persistency of this projection.
Although the precise perimeter of the metamorphosis of court at-
titudes and the scope of responses by the administrative agencies
may reside in the future, it is safe to conclude that socio-economic
1 10 Both Attorney General Mitchell and Antitrust Division Chief McLaren have
expressed firm conviction that existing legislation is capable of dealing with conglomera-
tion. Address by Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Ass'n, June 6, 1969,
in 115 CONG. REc. 6480 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
Il' It should be noted, however, that in two recent cases the government received
setbacks. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969
Trade Cas.) 5 72,943 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 1969); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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views on human resource allocation, a congery of expressions on
acquisition engineering, and notions on permissible aggregate size
will form the nucleus of the jurisprudence of conglomeration.
Firm judicial resistance constitutes the only real line of defense
against the demise of an antitrust policy oriented around a com-
petitive effect standard. This line is bending generally and on
occasion has broken. It is, therefore, only a question of time until
the administrative agencies move in to take full responsibility for
charting corporate growth. When this move is finalized it will
mean that conglomeration will have caused a reorientation in anti-
trust controls and an enlargement of governmental power greater in
range than would be likely under new legislation. Whereas leg-
islation covering conglomeration could be expected to eschew broad
powers of delegation in favor of specificity and predictability, execu-
tive control would in true bureaucratic fashion shift enforcement em-
phasis with the changing styles of influence. For those who sub-
scribe to the traditional antitrust approach, this is not an attractive
picture. Indeed, given a choice, statutorily decreed acquisition deter-
minism is preferable.
